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Abstract. We prove existence and uniqueness of stochastic equilibria in a class of
incomplete continuous-time financial environments where the market participants
are exponential utility maximizers with heterogeneous risk-aversion coefficients and
general Markovian random endowments. The incompleteness featured in our set-
ting - the source of which can be thought of as a credit event or a catastrophe -
is genuine in the sense that not only the prices, but also the family of replicable
claims itself is determined as a part of the equilibrium. Consequently, equilibrium
allocations are not necessarily Pareto optimal and the related representative-agent
techniques cannot be used. Instead, we follow a novel route based on new sta-
bility results for a class of semilinear partial differential equations related to the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the agents’ utility-maximization problems.
This approach leads to a reformulation of the problem where the Banach fixed
point theorem can be used not only to show existence and uniqueness, but also to
provide a simple and efficient numerical procedure for its computation.
1. Introduction
Market incompleteness and equilibria. The central theme of this paper is a study of an
equilibrium problem in an incomplete continuous-time stochastic setting. In contrast with the
complete case where significant advances have been made in continuous time (see, e.g., [1, 7, 9, 10,
11, 16, 17, 18, 31] as well as Chapter 4. of [19]) the incomplete-market literature is lagging behind.
Even among the few incomplete markets studied so far (see [2] or [14], for example) ideas related to
market completeness, typically through the representative-agent approach, are used. To the best
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of our knowledge, the present paper is the only one in continuous time where a fully-incomplete
market structure, in the sense that both the prices and the set of replicable claims (the marketed
subspace) are determined as a part of the equilibrium, is analyzed and existence of equilibria is
established.
The difficulty with incomplete markets is that Pareto optimality, which is commonly exploited to
establish existence of equilibrium in a complete market, is not guaranteed anymore. Our approach
rests upon the notion of stability of demand - a continuity property of the optimal response (optimal
portfolio) when viewed as a function of market dynamics (the market-price-of-risk process). The
leitmotif behind such an analysis is the following: if the aggregate demand can be shown to possess
good continuity properties in an appropriate topological setting, a fixed-point-type theorem can be
used to guarantee existence and (with some luck) uniqueness of an equilibrium market dynamics.
Stability in Hölder spaces. The technical bulk of the present manuscript is devoted to the
stability of the optimal investment strategy under small functional perturbations of the market-
price-of-risk coefficient. Problems similar to ours have attracted some attention recently - see, for
example, [4, 5, 15, 20, 23, 24]. There are at least three - at first glance very different - reasons why
such problems are important.
First, from the statistical and financial point of view, it is important to understand how misspec-
ification or misestimation of the market dynamics coefficients affects the optimal trading strategies
of agents who take the coefficient estimates at face value. Equivalently, one can wonder what
kinds of statistical procedures for the estimation of those coefficients yield the most stability in
implementation. For a deeper discussion of this point, we refer the reader to [24].
Second, in agreement with the classical methodology of the theory of partial differential equa-
tions, and applied mathematics in general, the following three aspects of every new problem are
typically studied: existence, uniqueness and sensitivity of the solution with respect to changes of
the problem’s input parameters. These criteria are generally known as Hadamard’s well-posedness
requirements (see [13]). We view model specification as one of the most important input data in the
utility-maximization problem, and understand the stability with respect to it as one of Hadamard’s
requirements.
The last reason - by far the most important one for the present paper - is to shed more light
on the intimate relationship between the notions of stability and that of competitive equilibrium
in incomplete markets. Indeed, rationality in the presence of individual preferences can be viewed
as the “law of motion” of financial agents. In aggregate over several investors, the optimal trading
strategies can be interpreted as the agregate demand for the assets in question. This aggregate de-
mand, via the principles of market clearing, ultimately determines the shape of the price-dynamics
of the financial assets.
Unlike other stability-related results mentioned above, the present paper approaches the problem
from a different point of view. While all the previous strategies involved probabilistic and convex-
analytic techniques, we tackle the problem from a pure PDE perspective. In this way we are
able to draw much stronger and more precise conclusions about the behavior of the function
which maps the market-price-of-risk process into the optimal portfolio. Our main stability result
is that this map is locally Lipschitz continuous when the inputs and the output are placed in
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anisotropic Hölder spaces on [0, T ]× R, and we give explicit estimates on the Lipschitz constant
(see Theorem 2.6). The price we pay for the PDE approach is not as dire as one may think when
placed in the equilibrium setting - the necessary Markovian assumption only restricts the form of
the agents’ random endowment to functions of state variables. The Markovian structure of the
resulting equilibrium asset dynamics is, on the other hand, not a restriction. It can be viewed as a
strenghtened version of an equilibrium existence result: not only do we show that an equilibrium
exists, we also show that a Markovian equilibrium exists.
In order to illustrate our techniques with the minimal amount of distraction, we choose what
can be termed as the simplest nontrivial incomplete market model. Indeed, our market consists
of a single risky asset (and a unit riskless asset) whose dynamics depend on a single Brownian
motion and a one-jump Poisson process. All the incompleteness in the market comes from this
uninsurable and unpredictable jump. Every agent is an exponential utility maximizer who also
receives a random endowment at the end of the time horizon and this random endowment is allowed
to depend on all sources of uncertainty in the market, including the indicator of the unpredictable
jump. As a form of a normalization, we assume that the volatility of the risky asset is constant,
but the drift can depend on time and the current value of both state processes - the Brownian
motion and the indicator of the unpredictable jump. It is clear that our setting can be generalized
in many different directions and that our estimates are far from optimal. Our goal was to provide
a proof of concept for the powerful PDE techniques outlined in the body of the paper. We strive
to keep the presentation as simple as possible and as accessible as possible to a reader who is
not a specialist in PDE. For that reason, we use only elementary techniques and results in the
Schauder-type theory of semilinear parabolic PDE as outlined, for example, in [21]. In the same
spirit, we do not pursue any connections with BSDE.
Existence and uniquencess of the equilibrium price dynamics. Once the local Lipschitz
continuity of the agents’ demand functions is established, we turn to the market-clearing conditions
and show that they can be rephrased in terms of a simple fixed-point problem for a continuous
map on an anisotropic Hölder space. Surprisingly, under a “smallness” condition, a restriction of
this map becomes a contraction and therefore, both existence and uniqueness of equilibrium can
be guaranteed. Furthermore, an efficient and easy-to-implement numerical technique - based on
iteration - emerges naturally. Results of this type are very rare in equilibrium theory; equilibria
are typically not unique and their multiplicity is often one of the major objections to the use
of equilibrium modelling in practice. Also, the computational methods (even in the fully-finite-
dimensional case) are often quite involved and based on inefficient and relatively hard-to-implement
procedures based on Sperner’s lemma and the related Scarf’s algorithm (see [28] and [29]).
The structure of the paper. Section 2. desribes the model and provides statements and some
proofs of our main results. Section 3. is devoted to the proof of the central stability results, while
Appendix A contains the pertinent information about Hölder spaces.
2. The financial environment and market clearing
We define our financial environment by specifying the structure of the three main ingredients:
the information structure, agents’ preferences and the completeness constraints.
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2.1. The information structure. Let T > 0 be a real number which we interpret as the time
horizon, and let {Bt}t∈[0,T ] be a standard Brownian motion defined on a complete probability space
(Ω,F ,P). We assume that, additionally, the same probability space accommodates an independent,
exponentially distributed random variable τ with parameter µ > 0, where the corresponding
counting process {Nt}t∈[0,T ] is given by
Nt = 1{τ≤t}, t ∈ [0, T ].
Let {Ft}t∈[0,T ] be the right-continuous augmentation of the filtration {FBt ∨ FNt }t∈[0,T ], where
FBt = σ({Bs}s≤t) and FNt = σ({Ns}s≤t) for t ∈ [0, T ].
A more detailed interpretation of the roles of the two filtrations will be given later. For now,
let us just mention that the σ-algebra Ft models the total publicly-available information at time
t and that τ models an event with a significant impact on the market. Our model does not deal
with asymmetric-information situations - all the agents have access to the same information, and
no information is hidden from any of them. As we shall explain below, it is the way in which the
information trickles into the dynamics of traded assets that makes the market incomplete.
2.2. Completeness constraints. The final goal of our analysis is the determination of the form
of an equilibrium asset-price process. Without exogenously-imposed constraints, there is nothing
that will prevent the agents from “opening” as many markets as possible, and, eventually, building
a market structure that will be able to replicate any uncertain pay-off. In other words, without
constraints - and bar pathologies - all equilibrium markets are necessarily complete. The situation
we are modelling, however, calls for a degree of incompleteness: we envision the situation in which
the random variable τ marks an event with the property that the time-scale at which the market
adjusts to τ is larger than the time-scale on which it reacts to the other information. Consequently,
as we shall see, its nature will be such that no perfect insurance against its effects can be bought
or sold.
More generally, market environments where a portion of the information flow affects prices
faster than the rest are important examples of natural constraints that preclude completeness;
we term them fast-and-slow-information market environments. In fact, many widely used
incomplete market models (virtually all models where the incompleteness stems from more “sources
of uncertainty” than available risky assets) can be viewed as equilibria in fast-and-slow-information
market environments. The situation described in the present paper corresponds to, arguably, the
simplest continuous-time fast-and-slow-information market environment. More complicated (and
realistic) environments can be constructed and analyzed, but we opt for one which allows us to
showcase our methods without unnecessary confusion.
The defining properties of τ lead to the following class of possible asset-price dynamics: let Λ be
the family of all {Ft}t∈[0,T ]-predictable processes {λt}t∈[0,T ] such that
∫ T
0 |λu| du < ∞, a.s., and
let S =
{
{S(λ)t }t∈[0,T ] : λ ∈ Λ
}
be the family of all Itô-processes {S(λ)t }t∈[0,T ] with the dynamics
given by
dS
(λ)
t = λt dt+ dBt, S
(λ)
0 = 0, (2.1)
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as λ ranges over Λ. Additionally, let Λbd be the subset of Λ consiting of all uniformly bounded λ.
The corresponding set of price processes is denoted by Sbd. We always (implicitly) assume that a
risk-free numéraire asset S¯ ≡ 1 accompanies each S(λ).
Remark 2.1.
(1) It is important to note that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the volatility
coefficient is identically equal to 1 or that “arithmetic” dynamics for S(λ) are chosen instead
the more common “geometric” one. Indeed, the only property of the asset-price dynamics
important for the determination of the equilibrium is the set of replicable random variables
it produces, and this depends on drift and volatility only through their quotient λ (the
so-called market price of risk). In fact, our formulation of the equilibrium simply cannot
distinguish between the two. This would be the case in the more complicated (and more
realistic) model where the agents’ random endowments depend on the asset-price itself,
i.e., where the agents hold financial derivatives of the asset. Similarly, the postulated
availability of a trivial numéraire asset S¯ involves a minimal loss of generality. Indeed,
the agents’ utilities depend solely on the terminal wealth and do not exhibit any time-
impatience characteristics. In fact, without introducing consumption into the model, it is
impossible to disentangle the two solely on the basis of equilibrium analysis.
(2) The two terms on the right-hand side of (2.1) contribute to the fluctuations in S(λ) on
different scales; the order of magnitude of the term λdt is dt while the order of (the
absolute value of) the term dBt is
√
dt. Equivalently, the first term takes on average
1/
√
dt times longer to produce the same (local) efect as the second one. In this sense, the
fact that the new information regarding τ comes in only through the first, slower, term
corresponds exactly to the requirement that the occurrence of τ be absorbed into the asset
dynamics on a slower scale than the shocks produced by B.
(3) One can view (2.1) as a restriction on the set of stochastic processes that may serve as
allowable market dynamics. For a different specification of the characteristics of the mar-
ket environment (constraints on the information flow, number of assets, etc), we would
get different families of processes. Therefore, one could give the following, abstract, defi-
nition: a completeness constraint is simply a family S of (possibly multi-dimensional)
semimartingales.
(4) While no dividend structure has been mentioned so far, there is a way of incorporating
dividends in the present model, and, perhaps, the best way to describe it is to compare it
to a particular incomplete setting - the one with short-lived securities - in the language of
[25] (see also how it leads to existence results in discrete time as in [25], Proposition 25.1, p.
255). One can think of the asset S(λ) as an aggregation of short-lived assets with inception
t and maturity t + dt, each of which pays a dividend S(λ)t+dt and costs S
(λ)
t . Equivalently,
the agent enters into a bet a unit of which pays dBt and costs −λt dt. In this way, we can
think of dBt as the local dividend and −λt as its price. It should be noted that it is easy
to incorporate any (reasonably behaved) martingaleMt of the formMt =
∫ t
0 σu dBu as the
divided process - one has to replace S(λ) by
∫ ·
0
σu dS
(λ)
u . Even if M is not a martingale, we
can simply add its drift to −λ and turn it into one. This procedure also allows us to give
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a loose interpretation of the formation of volatility in the market. While the market price
of risk λ is determined in the equilibrium from the agent’s primitives and the structural
properties of the dividends, the volatility is determined by their quantitative properties.
Consequently, the unit-volatility assumption we impose on S(λ) can be reinterpreted as a
simple normalization of the dividends.
2.3. The agents and their preferences. We assume there is a finite number I ∈ N of agents,
all of whom actively participate in trading in all available assets. The preference structure of each
one of them is determined by the following:
(I) the utility functions: each agent is an exponential-utility maximizer with
U i(x) = − exp(−γix), x ∈ R, γi > 0.
(II) the random endowment: E i = gi(BT , NT ), with bounded gi : R×{0, 1} → R, where further
regularity conditions are to be specified.
As usual in the Alt-von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility paradigm, agent i prefers the
random variable X1 ∈ FT to a random variable X2 ∈ FT if and only if E[U i(X1+E i)] ≥ E[U i(X2+
E i)], where we set E[Y ] = −∞ whenever E[Y +] = E[Y −] = +∞.
Remark 2.2.
(1) If one thinks about B and N as factors, (II) above states that the agents’ random endow-
ment depends on all factors driving the public information. In particular, the (conditional)
distribution of the random endowment may change abruptly and considerably at time τ .
One of the possible financial interpretations of the situation is that all agents hold (long
or short) positions in assets whose pay-offs are affected by the occurrence of τ (default-
sensitive derivatives, callable bonds, disaster-sensitive investments, etc.).
(2) The exponential nature of the utilities allows us to partially remove the assumption that all
agents use the same (subjective) probability to compute the expected utility of a particular
position. Indeed, using the identity
E
P
i
[− exp(−γi(X + E i))] = E[− exp(−γi(X + E˜ i))],
where E˜ i = E i − 1γi log(dP
i
dP ), we can easily “absorb” different subjective probabilities into
the form of the random endowment. Care must be taken, though, to ensure that the
appropriate integrability conditions are met. Also, it should be noted that such a change
of measure can lead to loss of the Markovian structure of the ingredients.
Let us now focus on the pertinent case when the set of tradable assets consists of a single risky
asset given by S(λ) ∈ Sbd, for some bounded market-price-of-risk process λ ∈ Λbd and the trivial
numéraire asset S¯ (as described just below equation (2.1), above). Agent i chooses a dynamic
self-financing portfolio process in the appropriate admissibility class (to be specified shortly) so as
to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth:
E[U i(
∫ T
0 piu dS
(λ)
u + E i)]→ max . (2.2)
Here, the value pit of the one-dimensional process {pit}t∈[0,T ] denotes the number of shares of the
risky asset in the portfolio. We do not explicitly mention the number of shares ρt of the riskless
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asset, since, thanks to the self-financing condition, it necessarily satisfies
ρt =
∫ t
0
piu dS
(λ)
u − pitS(λ)t . (2.3)
Our class of admissible portfolio processes aims to be just restrictive enough to rule out doubling
strategies, yet large enough to contain the maximizer of the utility-maximization problem (2.2).
We would like to emphasize that, due to the regularity of some of the ingredients, one does not need
the sophistication typically encountered in general semimartingale models (see, e.g., the classes Θi,
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 in [8] or the notion of permissibility in [26]). Instead, we sacrifice a small amount of
generality for a large gain in simplicity by proceeding as follows: the admissibility class A consists
of all {Ft}t∈[0,T ]-predictable processes {pit}t∈[0,T ] such that E[exp(
∫ T
0
(12 + ε)pi
2
u du)] <∞, for some
ε > 0. Note that, by Hölder’s inequality, the integral
∫ T
0 piu dS
(λ)
u is well-defined for each pi ∈ A
and λ ∈ Λ.
Remark 2.3. As we shall see later, the optimization problem (2.2) admits a dt × dP-unique max-
imizer pi(λ),i of (2.2) in the class A for each λ ∈ Λbd and each agent i = 1, . . . , I. The portfolio
process {pi(λ),it }t∈[0,T ] is interpreted as an optimal response of agent i to the market dynamics
induced by λ; the mapping {λt}t∈[0,T ] 7→ {pi(λ),it }t∈[0,T ] plays a central role in our analysis.
2.4. Market-clearing conditions and the main result. Having introduced all the ingredients,
we turn to our main problem. A central economic principle is that the prevailing market dynamics
must have the following fundamental property: the demand and supply for each tradable asset
must match, i.e., all markets must clear. A precise definition follows:
Definition 2.4. A process S(λ) ∈ S (or, equivalently, its market-price-of-risk process λ ∈ Λ) is
said to be an equilibrium price dynamics (market price of risk) if there exist processes
{pi(λ),it }t∈[0,T ] ∈ A, i = 1, . . . , I such that
(1) (rationality) for all pi ∈ A and all for all i = 1, . . . , I,
E[U i(
∫ T
0 pi
(λ),i
u dS
(λ)
u + E i)] ≥ E[U i(
∫ T
0 piu dS
(λ)
u + E i)], and
(2) (market clearing)
∑I
i=1 pi
(λ),i
t = 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
Remark 2.5. The reader will immediately realize that we only require market clearing for the risky
asset S(λ). The self-financing condition (2.3) implies, however, that the market for the riskless
asset S¯ will clear, in that case, as well.
The main result of the present paper - which asserts the existence, uniqueness and efficient
computability of equilibrium price dynamics - is summarized in Theorem 2.6 below (we direct the
reader to Appendix A for details on Hölder spaces and the related notation):
Theorem 2.6 (Existence, Uniqueness and Computability of Equilibria). Consider the setup given
in subsections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, and assume, additionally, that gi(·, n) ∈ C2+α(R), for i = 1, . . . , I,
n = 0, 1 and some α ∈ (0, 1]. Then there exists a constant T0 > 0 (which may depend on
α, µ, {γi}i=1,...,I and {|gi|2+α}i=1,...,I) such that for T ≤ T0,
(1) the equilibrium price dynamics exist and the corresponding market-price-of-risk process is
unique in the class of all processes {λt}t∈[0,T ] such that λt = λ(t, Bt, Nt−), t ∈ [0, T ], for
some function λ ∈ C1+α([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}).
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(2) the function λ is efficiently computable, i.e., there exists a subset D ⊆ C1+α([0, T ]× R×
{0, 1}) with 0 ∈ D and a contraction Π : D → D such that λ is the fixed point of Π.
Remark 2.7.
(1) The most restrictive feature of Theorem 2.6 is the “smallness” condition we place on the
size T of the time horizon. It is not evident that it can be dealt with by “pasting” equilibria
together as the upper bound on T depends on the primitives of the model. In particular,
extending an equilibrium from T to T ′ > T would entail using the value of the original
equilibrium at time T as the terminal condition of the equilibrium on [T, T ′]. An iteration
of this procedure may very well lead to a bounded sequence.
We do conjecture, however, that this assumption can be relaxed if one only wants to
establish the existence of the equilibrium, but cannot be relaxed if the additional benefits of
uniqueness and efficient computability are also desired. The resolution of those important
questions is the content of our future work and seem to require quite different and more
sophisticated techniques. Moreover, preliminary numerical experiments suggest that the
for a large class of realistic parameter values, the smallness constraint does not seem to be
binding and the iteration procedure converges.
(2) It is, perhaps, instructive to interpret the above uniqueness result in the light of part (4)
of Remark 2.1. What is truly unique is the equilibrium price of the local gamble of size
dWt. It follows that each replicable derivative security C admits a unique equilibrium price
process S. The difference with the complete models is that the class of replicable contingent
claims is determined as a part of the equilibrium and admits no simple description a priori.
The proof of Theorem 2.6 is based on the following stability estimate which, as discussed in
the introduction, is of interest in its own right. We devote the entire section 3 to its proof.
Since it deals with a single-agent’s optimization problem, we omit the agent index i from its
statement. Also, in the interest of readability, we introduce some additional notation: for a
function u : [0, T ]× R× {0, 1} → R, we define the n-difference un as
un(t, x, n) = u(t, x, 1)− u(t, x, n) =

u(t, x, 1)− u(t, x, 0), n = 0,0, n = 1.
For such functions, restrictions u(·, ·, 0) and u(·, ·, 1) are called the n = 0- and the n = 1-slices of
u. We say that a measurable function f : [0, T ]×R×{0, 1} → R is a Markov representative of
the process {Yt}t∈[0,T ] if
Yt = f(t, Bt, Nt−), for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
It is convenient to identify a process admitting a Markov representative with the Markov repre-
sentative itself. In fact, we will do so from this point on with little or no explicit mention.
Theorem 2.8 (Stability of the Optimal Portfolio). For λ ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R × {0, 1}) and g ∈
C2+α(R× {0, 1}) there exists a unique function u(λ) ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R × {0, 1}) which solves the
following Cauchy problem for a semilinear PDDE (partial diferential-difference equation):

0 = u
(λ)
t +
1
2u
(λ)
xx − λu(λ)x + 12γλ2 − µγ (exp(−γu(λ)n )− 1), on [0, T )× R× {0, 1},
u(λ)(T, ·, ·) = g.
(2.4)
Gordan Žitković Stochastic Equilibria 9
The stochastic process {pi(λ)t }t∈[0,T ] with the Markov representative pi(λ) = 1γλ − u
(λ)
x , i.e., the
process given by
pi
(λ)
t =
1
γλ(t, Bt, Nt−)− u(λ)x (t, Bt, Nt−), t ∈ [0, T ], (2.5)
is in A and attains the maximum in the utility-maximization problem (2.2).
The maps λ 7→ pi(λ), λ 7→ u(λ)x , from Cα([0, T ] × R × {0, 1}) to itself, are locally Lipschitz
continuous. More precisely, there exists a constant C = C(γ, µ, α) > 0 such that for each R > 0
and λ1, λ2 ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}) with |λ1|α, |λ2|α ≤ R we have
|u(λ1)x − u(λ2)x |α ≤ L(R)|λ1 − λ2|α, and |pi(λ1) − pi(λ2)|α ≤
(
1
γ + L(R)
)
|λ1 − λ2|α, (2.6)
where
L(R) = C T (1+α)/(2+α)ee
2+2γ|g|0+TR
2+2µT
(
|g|2+α + (1 + T )(1 +R2)
)6+4α
. (2.7)
With Theorem 2.8 at our disposal, the proof of Theorem 2.6 becomes straightforward. We start
with a characterization which follows directly from Definition 2.4 and equation (2.5) of Theorem
2.8. When the index i is added to u(λ) (or its derivatives), as in u(λ),i (or u(λ),ix , etc.), we are
referring to the solution to (2.4) with the agent-dependent terminal condition g = gi and the
risk-aversion parameter γ = γi.
Lemma 2.9. A process {λt}t∈[0,T ] with Markov representative λ ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R × {0, 1}) is an
equilibrium market-price-of-risk if and only if it is a fixed point of the operator Π : Cα([0, T ]×R×
{0, 1})→ Cα([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}) defined by
Π(λ) = γ¯
I∑
i=1
u(λ),ix ,
where γ¯ =
(∑I
i=1
1
γi
)−1
.
In the sequel, let R0 = 2γ¯
∑I
i=1 |u(0),ix |α (where u(0),ix corresponds to λ ≡ 0) be computed for
T = 1. Note that R0 dominates the value of the same expression we get when we set T < 1.
Lemma 2.10. There exists a constant T1 = T1(α, µ, {γi}i=1,...,I , {|gi|2+α}i=1,...,I) > 0, such that
if T ≤ T1, Π maps the ball
Bα(R0) = {λ ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}) : |λ|α ≤ R0},
of radius R0 in C
α([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}) into itself.
Proof. The first inequality in (2.6) of Theorem 2.8 implies that there exists a non-decreasing
function F : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) such that if T ≤ 1 we have
|u(λ),ix |α ≤ |u(0),ix |α + T 1/(2+α)F (|λ|α), and so |Π(λ)|α ≤ 12R0 + 1γ¯ I T 1/(2+α)F (|λ|α),
for λ ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R × {0, 1}) and all i = 1, . . . , I. Note that F , being derived from L(·) of
(2.7), depends on α, µ, γi, |gi|2+α, i = 1, . . . , I but not on T or λ for T ≤ 1. Therefore, for
T ≤ T1 = 1 ∧
(
γ¯R0
2IF (R0)
)2+α
, we have |Π(λ)|α ≤ R0, whenever |λ|α ≤ R0. 
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Lemma 2.11. There exists a constant T0 = T0(α, µ, {γi}i=1,...,I , {|gi|2+α}i=1,...,I) > 0 such that
if T ≤ T0, the mapping Π is a contraction from Bα(R0) into itself.
Proof. By Lemma 2.10, the mapping Π maps Bα(R0) into itself, as long as T ≤ T1. Therefore, we
can use the Lipschitz estimate (2.6) of Theorem 2.8 and reasoning similar to the one in the proof
of Lemma 2.10 to conclude that there exists T0 ≤ T1 such that for T ≤ T0, we have
|Π(λ1)−Π(λ2)|α ≤ 12 |λ1 − λ2|α,
for λ1, λ2 ∈ Bα(R0). 
Proof of Theorem 2.6. The path to the proof is paved by Lemmas 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11. Indeed, we
simply apply the Banach fixed point theorem to the mapping Π on the complete metric space
Bα(R0) and note that, by the first part of Theorem 2.8, Π(λ) ∈ C1+α([0, T ]×R×{0, 1}), as soon
as λ ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}). 
3. Stability of the optimal portfolio: a proof of Theorem 2.8
The purpose of the present section is to prove Theorem 2.8. We break its statement into several
smaller, more manageable results, and proceed to discuss them one by one.
3.1. The HJB equation: existence and verification. The first assertion of Theorem 2.8
is that a the PDDE in (2.4) admits a regular solution and that it can be used to construct a
Markov representative for the optimal portfolio in the utility maximization problem (2.2). Similar
characterizations are ubiquitous in stochastic control in the case of exponential utility, and are too
numerous to list; we simply instruct the reader to consult [6] and references therein. We note that
a PDDE is a special case of a partial integro-differential equation, but we choose not to use that
term because of the simplicity of the integral component. Equivalently, it could have been stated
as a system of one linear and one semilinear PDE.
Appendix A should be consulted for notation not explicitly introduced in the main body of the
paper. However, for the reader’s convenience, we state the following convention both here and in
subsection A.2 of Appendix A:
Convention 1.
(1) The variables µ, γ and α ∈ (0, 1) are considered “global” and will not change throughout the
paper. Any function of the global variables (and global variables only) if called a universal
constant.
(2) The notation a  b means that there exists a universal constant C > 0 such that a ≤ Cb.
Such a constant may change from line to line.
Our analysis starts with a simple linear existence result in the spirit of Schauder’s theory:
Lemma 3.1. For h, a ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R) and g ∈ C2+α(R) the Cauchy problem{
0 = ut +
1
2uxx + hux + a on [0, T )× R,
u(T, ·) = g(·) (3.1)
admits a unique solution u ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R). Moreover, for all β > 0 we have
|u|(β) ≤ 1β |a|(β) + |g|0. (3.2)
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Proof. The existence of a unique solution to (3.1) in C2+α([0, T ] × R) is well-known (see, for
example [21], Theorem 9.2.3, p. 140). To get (3.2), we use the fact that if u is the unique solution
to (3.1), then u˜(t, x) = e−β(T−t)u(t, x) solves{
0 = u˜t +
1
2 u˜xx − βu˜ + hu˜x + a˜ on [0, T )× R,
u˜(T, ·) = g(·), (3.3)
where a˜(t, x) = e−β(T−t)a(t, x). It remains to note that the constant function w(t, x) = |g|0 +
1
β |a˜|0 = |g|0 + 1β |a|(β) is a subsolution, and that its negative −w is a supersolution of (3.3); the
maximum principle (see [21], p.105, Theorem 8.1.2) implies
−w(t, x) ≤ u˜(t, w) ≤ w(t, x), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. (3.4)

When a non-linear term is added, a similar result can be obtained with a bit more work. The
argument is based in part on the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Let {xn}n∈N0 be a sequence of nonnegative real numbers with the property that
xn+1 ≤ A+Bxαn , (3.5)
for some constants A,B ≥ 0 and 0 < α < 1. Then there exists a constant g(α) > 1, independent
of A,B and {xn}n∈N, such that
lim sup
n
xn ≤ g(α)max(A,B1/(1−α)). (3.6)
In particular, the sequence {xn}n∈N is bounded.
Proof. If B = 0, the inequality in (3.6) clearly holds. When A = 0 and B > 0, we have xn ≤
B1+α+α
2+···+αn−1xα
n
0 , which implies (3.6) directly.
Focusing on the case A,B > 0, we set B˜ = B/A1−α, and let G > 1 be the unique positive
solution to G = 1 + B˜Gα. The scaled sequence yn = xn/(AG), n ∈ N satisfies
yn+1 =
1
AGxn ≤ 1/G+ B˜Gα−1(yn)α = κ+ (1− κ)yαn , (3.7)
where κ = G−1 = 1 − B˜Gα−1. Therefore, if yn ≤ 1, then yn+k ≤ 1, for all k ∈ N. On the other
hand, suppose that yn > 1, for all n ∈ N0. Then, for n ∈ N0, we have yn+1 ≤ yαn , and so, yn ≤ yα
n
0 .
Consequently, lim supn→∞ yn ≤ 1, i.e., lim supn xn ≤ AG.
It remains to show that AG is bounded from above by the expression on the right-hand side of
(3.6). Let g(α) be the unique positive solution of g(α) = 1 + g(α)α, so that g(α) > 1. If B˜ ≥ 1,
then
1 + B˜(g(α)B˜1/(1−α))α = 1 + (g(α)− 1)B˜1/(1−α) ≤ g(α)B˜1/(1−α).
Therefore, the monotonicity of the function x 7→ x − 1 − B˜xα implies that G ≤ g(α)B˜1/(1−α).
When B˜ ≤ 1, we have 1 + B˜g(α)α ≤ g(α), so G ≤ g(α). Therefore,
AG ≤ Ag(α)max(1, B˜1/(1−α)) = g(α)max(A,B1/(1−α)).

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The existence of a C2 solution to semilinear equations of the type treated in Proposition 3.3 is
well-known (see, for example, [3]). However, the C2+α-regularity and the |·|0 and [·]2+α estimates
need additional work in this proof. The reader will note that we still go through the steps of
the existence argument; the reason is that the Hölder regularity is established through the | · |0-
convergent sequence which is originally constructed to show the existence of a C2 solution.
Proposition 3.3. Consider a semilinear Cauchy problem of the form{
0 = ut +
1
2uxx + hux + a− beγu on [0, T )× R,
u(T, ·) = g, (3.8)
where g ∈ C2+α(R), h ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R), a, b ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R), γ > 0 and a(t, x) ≥ 0, b(t, x) ≥ 0,
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R. Then (3.8) admits a unique solution in C2+α([0, T ]× R). Furthermore,
the following bounds hold for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R:
− 1γ log(eγ|g|0 + γT |b|0) ≤ u(t, x) ≤ |g|0 + T |a|0, (3.9)
[u]2+α  [g]2+α + [a]α + [b]αeγ(|g|0+T |a|0) +
(
1 + |b|1+α0 eγ(1+
1
2α)(T |a|0+|g|0) + |h|2+αα
)|u|0. (3.10)
Proof. We start by setting F (t, x, y) = a(t, x) − b(t, x) exp(γy), and note that, by Lemma A.6,
F (·, ·, w(·, ·)) is in Cα([0, T ]×R), whenever w is. Therefore, by Lemma 3.1, for each w ∈ Cα([0, T ]×
R), there exists a unique C2+α([0, T ]× R)-solution u of the Cauchy problem{
0 = ut +
1
2uxx + hux + F (·, ·, w(·, ·)) on [0, T )× R,
u(T, ·) = g(·). (3.11)
Consequently, due to Lemma 3.1, the operator G : Cα([0, T ]×R)→ C2+α([0, T ]×R) which assigns
to w ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R) the unique solution of (3.11) is well-defined. For u1, u2 ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R),
the function κ = Gu1 − Gu2 satisfies{
0 = κt +
1
2κxx + hκx + δ on [0, T )× R,
κ(T, ·) = 0. (3.12)
where δ(t, x) = F (t, x, u1(t, x))− F (t, x, u2(t, x)). The inequality (3.2) of Lemma 3.1 implies that
|κ|(β) = |Gu2 − Gu1|(β) ≤ 1β |δ|(β). (3.13)
On the other hand, using inequality (A.10) of Lemma A.6, we obtain
|δ|(β) ≤ βe−β(T−t) |b(t, x)| γeγ⌈u1⌉∨⌈u2⌉ |u2(t, x) − u1(t, x)|0 , (3.14)
where we remind the reader that ⌈u⌉ = sup(t,x)∈[0,T ]×R u(t, x).
If u belongs to the range RG of G, then the maximum principle applied to equation (3.11) and
the non-negativity of b imply that
⌈u⌉ ≤ T |a|0 + |g|0. (3.15)
Inequalities (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15) show that for u1, u2 ∈ RG
|Gu2 − Gu1|(β) ≤
1
β
|b|0γeγ(T |a|0+|g|0)|u2 − u1|(β). (3.16)
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It follows that the mapping G is a | · |(β)-contraction for β > 0 large enough. For such β, the
sequence {un}n∈N, where u1 ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R) and un+1 = Gun, n ∈ N, converges towards some
uˆ ∈ C([0, T ]×R) in | · |(β), and, therefore, also in | · |0. Our next task is to show that uˆ is not only
in C([0, T ]× R), but also in Cα([0, T ]× R) and that it is, indeed, a fixed point of G.
Let u ∈ RG and set u˜ = Gu. Then, the inequality (3.15) is satsified by u˜ as well. Moreover,
applying the maximum principle once again to equation (3.11), we get that
−|g|0 − T |b|0eγ(T |a|0+|g|0) ≤ u˜(t, x). (3.17)
Combining (3.17) with inequality (3.15) for u˜, we obtain
|u˜|0 ≤ |g|0 + T max{|a|0, |b|0eγ(T |a|0+|g|0)}. (3.18)
which provides a uniform | · |0-bound on all elements of the sequence {un}n∈N. In the remainder of
the proof, D will denote a generic constant which may depend on α, T, γ, |h|α, |a|α, |b|α or |g|2+α,
but is independent of n and u1 and may change from occurrence to occurrence. Thanks to the
uniform bound on |un|0 established in (3.18) and recalling that un+1 = Gun ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R),
the first inequality in (A.5) of Theorem A.3 yields
[un+1]α ≤ D[un+1]α/(2+α)2+α . (3.19)
On the other hand, Corollary A.5 implies that
[un+1]2+α ≤ D
(
[g]2+α + (1 + |h|2+αα )|un+1|0 + [a− beγun ]α
)
, (3.20)
while by inequality (A.9) of Lemma A.6, we have [eγw]α ≤ γeγ⌈w⌉[w]α for any w ∈ Cα([0, T ]×R).
So, using once more the uniform bound (3.18) on |un|0, we get
[un+1]2+α ≤ D(1 + |b|α|eγun |α) ≤ D(1 + [un]α).
Therefore, by (3.19), we have
[un+1]α ≤ D(1 + [un]α)α/(2+α), for n ∈ N.
This fact implies that the sequence xn = [un]
(2+α)/α
α satisfies (3.5) with A = B = D(2+α)/α so that
by Lemma 3.2,
sup
n
[un]α <∞.
It is not difficult to see that the | · |0-closure of a | · |α-bounded subset of C([0, T ]× R) is, in fact,
a subset of Cα([0, T ]× R). Consequently, the | · |0-limit uˆ of {un}n∈N is in Cα([0, T ]× R), and in
particular, Guˆ is well-defined. Inequality (3.16) yields
|Guˆ− un+1|0 = |Guˆ − Gun|0 ≤ D|uˆ− un|0,
so that Guˆ = limn un = uˆ, i.e., uˆ solves (3.8). Moreover, any solution u must satisfy (3.15) and
the relation (3.16) guarantees that uˆ is unique in the class Cα([0, T ]× R).
To establish the bounds in (3.9) we pick two continuous functions aˆ, bˆ : [0, T ]→ R and consider
the function
w(t, x) = A(t)− 1
γ
log
[
γB(t) + exp(−γG)
]
,
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where A(t) =
∫ T
t aˆ(u) du, B(t) =
∫ T
t bˆ(u)e
γA(u) du ≥ 0, and G is an arbitrary constant. As the
reader can easily check, we have

0 =wt +
1
2wxx + h(t, x)wx + a(t, x) − b(t, x)eγw
− (a(t, x)− aˆ(t)) − (bˆ(t)− b(t, x))eγw(t,x)
w(T , ·) = G.
For different choices of functions aˆ, bˆ and the constant G, w will be either a sub- or a supersolution
of (3.8). Indeed, for G = |g|0, aˆ(t) = |a|0 and bˆ(t) = 0, w becomes a supersolution, yielding the
upper bound in (3.9). Similarly, for G = −|g|0, aˆ(t) = 0 and bˆ(t) = |b|0, w is a subsolution, and
so, the lower bound in (3.9) holds, too.
The last item on our list is the [·]2+α-bound (3.10). Estimate (A.7), along with Lemma A.6 and
the just established (3.9), yields
[u]2+α  [g]2+α + [a]α + [beγu]α + (1 + |h|2+αα )|u|0
 [g]2+α + [a]α + [b]αeγ⌈u⌉ + |b|0[eγu]α + (1 + |h|2+αα )|u|0
 [g]2+α + [a]α + [b]αeγ(T |a|0+|g|0) + |b|0γeγ(T |a|0+|g|0)[u]α + (1 + |h|2+αα )|u|0.
The inequality (3.10) now follows directly from Corollary A.2. 
Finally, we integrate Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.3 and discuss the difficulties in the standard
verification argument.
Proposition 3.4. For λ ∈ Cα([0, T ]×R×{0, 1}) and g ∈ C2+α(R×{0, 1}) there exists a unique
function u(λ) ∈ C2+α([0, T ] × R × {0, 1}) which solves the Cauchy problem (2.4). Moreover, the
stochastic process {pi(λ)t }t∈[0,T ] with Markov representative pi(λ) = 1γλ − u
(λ)
x is in A and attains
the maximum in the utility maximization problem (2.2).
Proof. We note, first, that the n = 1-slice of the equation (2.4) has the form (3.1) with h(t, x) =
−λ(t, x) ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R), a(t, x) = 12γλ2(t, x) ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R). By Lemma 3.1, it admits a
unique C2+α([0, T ] × R)-solution u(·, ·, 1). Therefore, the n = 0-slice is of the form (3.8) with
h(t, x) = −λ(t, x), a(t, x) = 1γ (12λ2(t, x) + µ) and b(t, x) = µγ e−γu(t,x,1); the assumptions placed on
λ and the Cα([0, T ] × R)-property of u(·, ·, 1) imply that Proposition 3.3 can be applied. Hence,
(2.4) admits a unique solution u(λ) ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}).
Having established existence and regularity of the solution u of (2.4), we turn to the second
statement - namely, that the process pi(λ), defined in the statement, is optimal for (2.2). First, we
consider the function v : [0, T ]× R× R× {0, 1} → (−∞, 0), given by
v(t, ξ, x, n) = −e−γ
(
ξ+u(λ)(t,x,n)
)
.
The reader will easily check that v is a classical solution of the following PDDE - the formal HJB
equation for the utility-maximization problem (2.2):

0 = vt + sup
pi∈R
(
1
2vxx + piλvξ +
1
2pi
2vξξ + pivxξ + µvn
)
v(T, ·, ·) = −e−γ
(
ξ+g(x,n)
)
,
(3.21)
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with all regularity inherited from u(λ). The equation (3.21) is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion for the control problem (2.2), where the variables ξ, x, n correspond to the wealth process∫ ·
0 pi
(λ)
u dS
(λ)
u , the Brownian motion B and the jump process N , respectively. The standard verifi-
cation procedure (see, e.g., the ideas in the proof of Theorem 8.1, p. 141 in [12]) can be used to
show that v is indeed the value function of the utility-maximization problem and that the form of
the optimal portfolio can be recognized as the optimal value of the parameter pi in the maximiza-
tion in (3.21). The so-obtained pi is admissible since it is uniformly bounded. The usual difficulty
one encounters in the course of the verification procedure - namely, the one involved in establishing
the martingale property of certain local martingales - is easily dealt with here. One simply needs
to observe that v and u(λ)x are uniformly bounded and use the square-integrability of pi ∈ A. 
3.2. Stability of the optimal portfolio. Having established the existence and uniqueness of
the regular solution to (2.4), we turn to the study of the map λ 7→ u(λ) in order to prove the
statements in the second part of Theorem 2.8. We start with some preliminary growth estimates.
Proposition 3.5. Let u ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}) be the unique solution to (2.4). Define
M0 = γ|g|0 + 12T |λ|20 + µT, Mα = γ|g|2+α + (T + 1)(12 |λ|2α + µ). (3.22)
Then,
|u(λ)|0 M0, and [u(λ)]2+α M2+α/2α e(2+α)M0 . (3.23)
Proof. Set L0 = |λ|0, Lα = |λ|α and G = |g|2+α, and letM0,Mα be as in (3.22). We start with the
n = 1-slice first; to make the notation more palatable, we write simply u¯ for u(λ)(·, ·, 1) and λ¯ for
λ(·, ·, 1) so that u¯ satisfies the linear equation (3.1) with a = 12γ λ¯2 and h = −λ¯. With g = g(·, 1),
the maximum principle implies that
|u¯|0 ≤ T |a|0 + |g¯|0 ≤ 12γTL20 + |g|0 M0. (3.24)
Corollary A.5 yields
[u¯]2+α  G+ 12γ [λ¯2]α +
(
1 + |λ¯|2+αα
)|u¯|0
 G+ L2α + (1 + L2+αα )(12TL2α + γG)
 (1 + L2+αα )(G+ (1 + T )L2α) Mα(1 + L2+αα ) M2+α/2α ,
(3.25)
where the last inequality is a consequence of the fact that the function ρ 7→ (1 + xρ)1/ρ is nonin-
creasing in ρ for x ≥ 0 and ρ > 0. Also, due to the first inequality in (A.5) and the just established
(3.24) and (3.25), we have
[u¯]α  [u¯]
α
2+α
2+α |u¯|
2
2+α
0  (M
2+
α
2
α )
α
2+α M
2
2+α
0 M
2+
α
2
α . (3.26)
We move on to the n = 0-slice, and write u(·, ·) for u(λ)(·, ·, 0) and λ for λ(·, ·, 0) so that u
satisfies the semi-linear Cauchy problem (3.8) with a = 12γλ
2 + µγ , h = −λ and b = µγ exp(−γu¯).
Note that u¯ also solves equation (3.8) with a = 12γ λ¯
2, h = −λ¯ and b = 0, so that the estimate (3.9)
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implies |e−γu¯|0 = e−γ⌊u¯⌋ ≤ eγ|g¯|0 , as well as
|u|0 ≤ max
(
1
2γT (L
2
0 + 2µ) + |g|0, 1γ log(eγ|g|0 + µT |e−γu¯|0)
)
≤ |g|0 + 1γ max
(
T (12L
2
0 + µ), log(1 + µT )
)
.
This result, together with (3.24) and the fact that µT ≥ log(1 + µT ), yields the | · |0-bound in
(3.23). By inequality (A.9) of Lemma A.6 and estimates (3.9) and (3.26), we have
[e−γu¯]α ≤ γeγGM2+
α
2
α . (3.27)
Hence, using again the estimate (3.9) for u¯, the just established first inequality in (3.23) and (3.27),
we obtain
[e−γu¯eγu]α  eγGeM0M2+
α
2
α + e
γGeM0 [u]α = e
γG+M0(M
2+
α
2
α + [u]α).
So, due to Corollary A.5,
[u]2+α  [g]2+α + 1
2γ
[λ2]α +
µ
γ [e
−γu¯eγu]α + (1 + |λ|2+αα )|u|0
 1γ (γG+ 12L2α + µ) + [e−γu¯eγu]α + (1 + L2+αα )|u|0
M0 + eM0+γGM2+
α
2
α + e
M0+γG[u]α + (1 + L
2+α
α )|u|0.
Therefore, thanks to Corollary A.2 and the first inequality in (3.23),
[u¯]2+α  eγG+M0 +
(
e(γG+M0)(1+
α
2 ) + 1 + L2+αα
)
|u|0.
Thus, using once more the decrease of the function ρ 7→ (1+xρ)1/ρ, x, ρ > 0 and the first inequality
of (3.23), we get
[u]2+α  e(2+α)M0M2+
α
2
α +M0M
2+
α
2
α  e(2+α)M0M2+
α
2
α .
The last inequality, along with (3.25), completes the proof. 
The multiplicative interpolation inequalities of Theorem A.3 yield the following corollary:
Corollary 3.6. Let u(λ) ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R × {0, 1}) be the unique solution to (2.4), and let M0
and Mα be as in (3.22). Then, the following estimates hold
[u(λ)]α M2+α/2α eαM0 , |u(λ)x |0 M2+α/2α eM0 (3.28)
[u(λ)x ]α M2+α/2α e(1+α)M0 , |u(λ)x |α M2+α/2α e(1+α)M0 .
We continue with a stability estimate for the nonlinear, n = 1-slice.
Proposition 3.7. For g ∈ C2+α(R), a(k) ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R), h(k) ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R) and b(k) ∈
Cα([0, T ]× R), let u(k), k = 1, 2 be the unique C2+α([0, T ]× R)-solution to

0 = u
(k)
t +
1
2u
(k)
xx + h
(k)u(k)x + a
(k) − b(k)eγu(k) on [0, T )× R,
u(k)(T, ·) = g,
(3.29)
and let
D = 1 +max
(
|b(1)|1+α/2α , |u(1)x |α, |u(2)|α, |h(2)|2+αα
)
, P = γeγ⌈u
(1)⌉∨⌈u(2)⌉.
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Then,
|u(2) − u(1)|0 ≤ TeT |b
(1)|0P
(
|a(δ)|0 +D|h(δ)|0 + P |b(δ)|0
)
, and (3.30)
[u(2) − u(1)]2+α  [a(δ)]α +D|h(δ)|α + PD|b(δ)|α + P 1+α/2D|u(2) − u(1)|0, (3.31)
where a(δ) = a(2) − a(1), h(δ) = h(2) − h(1) and b(δ) = b(2) − b(1).
Proof. Set u(δ) = u(2)− u(1) and subtract the equations (3.29) with k = 2 and k = 1, respectively,
to obtain that u(δ) is a C2+α([0, T ]× R)-solution to the following semilinear Cauchy problem

0 = u
(δ)
t +
1
2u
(δ)
xx + h
(2)u(δ)x + h
(δ)u(1)x + a
(δ)
− b(δ)eγu(2) − b(1)(eγu(2) − eγu(1)), on [0, T )× R,
u(δ)(T, ·) = 0.
(3.32)
To alleviate the notation, we set
K0 = |h(δ)u(1)x + a(δ) − b(δ)eγu
(2) |0 and Kα = [h(δ)u(1)x + a(δ) − b(δ)eγu
(2)
]α.
First, we establish the | · |0-bound in (3.30). Let U(t) = supx∈R
∣∣u(δ)(t, x)∣∣ so that, by the mean
value theorem, we have∣∣∣eγu(2)(t,x) − eγu(1)(t,x)∣∣∣ ≤ P U(t), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Hence, the maximum principle with equation (3.32) implies∣∣∣u(δ)(t, x)∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ T
t
(
K0 + |b(1)|0P U(s)
)
ds. (3.33)
We can, therefore, employ Gronwall’s inequality (see, e.g., [27], p. 543) to obtain
U(t) ≤ (T − t)K0e(T−t)|b
(1)|0P ≤ TK0eT |b
(1)|0P .
Noting that K0 ≤ D|h(δ)|0 + |a(δ)|0 + P |b(δ)|0, we conclude that (3.30) holds.
Turning to the [·]2+α-bound (3.31), we use Corollary A.5 and Lemma A.6 to conclude that
[u(δ)]2+α  [h(δ)u(1)x + a(δ) − b(δ)eγu
(2) − b(1)(eγu(2) − eγu(1))]α +
(
1 + |h(2)|2+αα
)
|u(δ)|0
 Kα + |b(1)|0[eγu
(2) − eγu(1) ]α + [b(1)]α|eγu
(2) − eγu(1) |0 +D|u(δ)|0
 Kα + |b(1)|0P [u(δ)]α + P |u(2)|α|u(δ)|0 + [b(1)]αP |u(δ)|0 +D|u(δ)|0.
(3.34)
Therefore, by Corollary A.2, we have
[u(δ)]2+α  Kα +
(
P |b(1)|0)1+α/2 + P |u(2)|α + P [b(1)]α +D
)
|u(δ)|0
 Kα + P 1+α/2D|u(δ)|0.
(3.35)
Finally, due to Lemma A.6, Kα  D|h(δ)|α + [a(δ)]α + PD|b(δ)|α, which implies (3.31). 
In conjunction with the multiplicative interpolation inequalities of Theorem A.3, our final result,
Proposition 3.8, yields the remaining statements of Theorem 2.8.
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Proposition 3.8. For g ∈ C2+α([0, T ]×R×{0, 1}) and k = 1, 2, let u(k) ∈ C2+α([0, T ]×R×{0, 1})
be the unique solution to (2.4), corresponding to λ = λ(k) ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}). Then,
|u(2) − u(1)|0  T M2+2αα ee
2M0+1 |λ(2) − λ(1)|0, and
[u(2) − u(1)]2+α M7+3αα ee
2M0+2 |λ(2) − λ(1)|α,
where
M0 = γ|g|0 + µT + 12T max(|λ(1)|0, |λ(2)|0)2, and
Mα = |g|2+α + (1 + T )
(
µ+ 12 max(|λ(1)|α, |λ(2)|α)2
)
.
Proof. Let L0 = max(|λ(1)|0, |λ(2)|0), Lα = max((|λ(1)|α, |λ(2)|α), G0 = |g|0 and G = |g|2+α. Then,
M0 = γG0 + µT +
1
2TL
2
0, Mα = G+ (1 + T )(1 + L
2
α).
Just like in the proof of Proposition 3.5, we deal with the n = 1-slice first; again, to make the
notation more palatable, we write u¯(k) for u(k)(·, ·, 1) and λ¯(k) for λ(k)(·, ·, 1) so that u¯(k) satisfies the
linear equation (3.29) with a(k) = 12γ (λ¯
(k))2, h(k) = −λ¯(k) and b(k) = 0. Also, set u¯(δ) = u¯(2)− u¯(1),
∆0 = |λ(2) − λ(1)|0 and ∆α = |λ(2) − λ(1)|α. Then, u¯(δ) solves the Cauchy problem (3.32) with
h(δ) = −λ¯(2) + λ¯(1), a(δ) = 12γ ((λ¯(2))2 − (λ¯(1))2) and b(δ) = 0. Inequality (3.33) and Corollary 3.6
yield
|u¯(δ)|0  T (L0∆0 + |u¯(1)x |0∆0)  T∆0(L0 +M2+α/2α eM0)  TM2+α/2α eM0∆0. (3.36)
So, by Corolary A.5, estimate (3.28) and the decrease of the function ρ 7→ (1 + xρ)1/ρ, we have
[u¯(δ)]2+α  |u¯(1)x |α∆α +∆αLα + (1 + L2+αα )|u¯(δ)|0

(
M2+α/2α e
(1+α)M0 +Mα +M
1+α/2
α TM
2+α/2
α e
M0
)
∆α
M4+αα e(1+α)M0∆α.
(3.37)
Consequently, the multiplicative interpolation inequalities of Theorem A.3 imply
[u¯(δ)]α  T 2/(2+α)M2+2αα e(1+α)M0∆α. (3.38)
We proceed with the n = 0-slice, and write u(k)(·, ·) for u(k)(·, ·, 0) and λ(k) for λ(k)(·, ·, 0) so
that u(k) satisfies the semi-linear Cauchy problem (3.8) with a(k) = 12γ (λ
(k))2 + µγ , h
(k) = −λ(k)
and b(k) = µγ exp(−γu¯(k)). Set
D = M2+2αα e
(1+2α)M0 and P = γeγ⌈g⌉+
1
2TL
2
0 ,
so that, by Proposition 3.5, Corollary 3.6 and inequality (3.15), D and P dominate (in the 
−sense) the D and P of Proposition 3.7 with the current choice of b(1), u(1), u(2) and h(2).
Set u(δ) = u(2)−u(1). Then u(δ) satisfies the equation (3.32) with u(1) = u(1), h(2) = −λ(2), h(δ) =
−λ(2)+λ(1), a(δ) = 12γ ((λ(2))2−(λ(1))2), b(δ) = µγ (exp(−γu¯(2))−exp(−γu¯(1))) and b(1) = µγ exp(−γu¯(1)).
Inequality (3.30) of Proposition 3.7 and the lower bound on u¯(1) in (3.9) give us
|u(δ)|0  TeT |b
(1)|0P ( 12γ |(λ(2))2 − (λ(1))2|0 +D| − λ(2) + λ(1)|0 + P |e−γu¯
(1) − e−γu¯(2) |0)
 TeTµe2γG0+
1
2TL
2
0
(∆0L0 +D∆0 + P |e−γu¯
(1) − e−γu¯(2) |0).
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On the other hand, thanks to Lemma A.6, the lower bound on u¯(1) and u¯(2) in (3.9) and inequality
(3.36), we have
|e−γu¯(2) − e−γu¯(1) |0  γeγG0|u¯(δ)|0  γeγG0TM2+α/2α eM0∆0.
Combining the last two inequalities we, obtain
|u(δ)|0  TeTµe
2γG0+
1
2TL
2
0
(L0 +D + Pe
γG0TM2+α/2α e
M0)∆0
 TeTµe2γG0+
1
2TL
2
0
(M2+2αα e
(1+2α)M0 + PeγG0TM2+α/2α e
M0)∆0
 TeTµe2γG0+
1
2TL
2
0
M2+2αα e
(1+2α)M0(1 + e2γG0+
1
2TL
2
0T )∆0
 T (1 + T )eTµe2γG0+
1
2TL
2
0
M2+2αα e
(1+2α)M0e2γG0+
1
2TL
2
0∆0
 TM2+2αα eA∆0,
(3.39)
where A = log(1 + µT ) +M0 + µTe2γG0+1/2TL
2
0 + (1 + 2α)M0 + 2γG0 +
1
2TL
2
0. Since
x
ex ≤ 1e , for
all x ≥ 0 and log(1 + µT ) ≤ µT , we have
A = log(1 + µT ) +M0 + µTe
γG0+M0−µT + (1 + 2α)M0 +M0 + γG0 − µT
M0 + eγG0+M0 µTeµT + (2 + 2α)M0 + γG0  e2M0+1.
(3.40)
It remains to estimate the [·]2+α-seminorm of u(δ). By (3.24),(3.25) and Theorem A.3, we have
1 + [u¯(2)]α  1 + (M2+α/2α )α/(2+α)M2/(2+α)0  1 +M1+αα M1+αα . (3.41)
Applying Corollaries A.5 and 3.6, and using the decrease of the function ρ 7→ (1+ xρ)1/ρ, x, ρ > 0,
we get
[u(δ)]2+α  ∆α|u(1)x |α + Lα∆α + eγG0(1 + [u(2)]α)|e−γu¯
(2) − e−γu¯(1) |α
+ |e−γu¯(1) |α|eγu
(2) − eγu(1) |α + (1 + L2+αα )|u(δ)|0
 ∆αM2+α/2α e(1+α)M0 +Mα∆α + eγG0(1 +M2+α/2α eαM0)|e−γu¯
(2) − e−γu¯(1) |α
+ |e−γu¯(1) |α|eγu
(2) − eγu(1) |α +M1+α/2α |u(δ)|0.
(3.42)
On the other hand, by Lemma A.6, the lower bound on u¯(1) and u¯(2) in (3.9), and inequalities
(3.36), (3.37) and (3.41), we have
|e−γu¯(2) − e−γu¯(1) |α  eγG0
(|u¯(δ)|0(1 + [u¯(2)]α) + [u¯(δ)]α)
 eγG0(TM2+3α/2α eM0 + T 2/(2+α)M2+2αα e(1+α)M0)∆α
M4+3α/2α e(2+α)M0∆α.
(3.43)
Moreover, due to Lemma A.6 and Corollary 3.6, |e−γu¯(1) |α M2+α/2α e(1+α)M0 and, with the upper
bound in (3.9) and inequalities (3.39) and (3.40) in mind,
|e−γu(2) − e−γu(1) |α  eM0
(
TM2+2αα e
e2M0+1∆0(1 +M
2+α/2
α e
αM0) + [u¯(δ)]α
)
M5+5α/2α ee
2M0+1
e(1+α)M0∆0 + e
M0 [u¯(δ)]α.
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So,
|e−γu¯(1) |α|e−γu
(2) − e−γu(1) |α M7+3αα ee
2M0+1
e(2+2α)M0∆0 +M
2+α/2
α e
(2+α)M0 [u¯(δ)]α. (3.44)
Combining inequalities (3.42), (3.43) and (3.44), we get
[u(δ)]2+α M2+α/2α e(1+α)M0∆α +M2+α/2α e(1+α)M0M4+3α/2α e(2+α)M0∆α
+M7+3αα e
e2M0+1e(2+2α)M0∆α +M
2+α/2
α e
(2+α)M0 [u¯(δ)]α +M
1+α/2
α |u(δ)|0
M7+3αα ee
2M0+1
e(3+2α)M0∆α +M
2+α/2
α e
(2+α)M0 [u¯(δ)]α +M
1+α/2
α |u(δ)|0.
Thanks to Corollary A.2, we obtain
[u(δ)]2+α M7+3αα ee
2M0+1
e(3+2α)M0∆α +
(
(M2+α/2α e
(2+α)M0)1+α/2 +M1+α/2α
)|u(δ)|0
M7+3αα ee
2M0+1
e(3+2α)M0∆α +M
2+2α
α e
(2+5α/2)M0 |u(δ)|0.
Finally, due to inequality (3.39), we get
[u(δ)]2+α M7+3αα ee
2M0+1
e(3+2α)M0∆α +M
5+4α
α e
(2+5α/2)M0ee
2M0+1
∆α
M7+3αα ee
2(M0+1)
∆α.

Appendix A. Anisotropic Hölder Spaces
A.1. Definitions and notation. Classical (anisotropic) Hölder spaces provide a convenient set-
ting for stability analysis of a class of utility-maximization problems. Here is a short overview of
the notation and some basic definitions.
Let C([0, T ]×R) be the set of all continuous functions u : [0, T ]×R→ R, and let Cb([0, T ]×R)
be a sub-class of C([0, T ]×R) containing only bounded functions. Cb([0, T ]×R) is a Banach space
under the “sup”-norm
|u|0 = sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×R
|u(t, x)| .
In addition to the “vanilla” norm | · |0, we introduce a family of equivalent, weighted, norms
{| · |(β) : β ≥ 0}, given by
|u|(β) = sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×R
e−β(T−t) |u(t, x)| , for β ≥ 0.
Due to the importance of one-sided bounds, we use the following notation
⌈u⌉ = sup
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×R
u(t, x), ⌊u⌋ = inf
(t,x)∈[0,T ]×R
u(t, x),
as well as their section-wise counterparts
⌈u(t, ·)⌉ = sup
x∈R
u(t, x), ⌊u(t, ·)⌋ = inf
x∈R
u(t, x).
The parabolic distance dp between (t1, x1) and (t2, x2) in [0, T ]× R is defined by
dp
(
(t1, x1), (t2, x2)
)
=
√
|t1 − t2|+ |x1 − x2| .
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For a function u ∈ C([0, T ] × R) and a constant α ∈ (0, 1], we define its α-Hölder constant
[u]α ∈ [0,∞] by
[u]α = sup
(t1,x1) 6=(t2,x2)∈[0,T ]×R
|u(t1, x1)− u(t2, x2)|
dp
(
(t1, x1), (t2, x2)
)α . (A.1)
The functional | · |α, given by
|u|α = |u|0 + [u]α, (A.2)
is a norm and it turns the class Cα([0, T ]×R) of all functions u ∈ Cb([0, T ]×R) for which [u]α <∞
into a Banach space.
For k ∈ N, the space Ck([0, T ]×R) contains all functions u ∈ C([0, T ]×R) such that the partial
derivatives ∂
m+n
∂tm∂xn u exist and are continuous on (0, T )×R, for all m,n ∈ N0 such that 2m+n ≤ k.
For k ∈ N and α ∈ (0, 1] we introduce the space Ck+α([0, T ]× R) by
Ck+α([0, T ]× R) = {u ∈ Ck([0, T ]× R) : ∂m+n∂xn∂tmu admit extensions in Cα([0, T ]× R)
for all m,n ∈ N0 such that 2m+ n ≤ k}.
(A.3)
The norm | · |k+α, given by
|u|k+α =
∑
2m+n=k
[ ∂
m+n
∂xn∂tmu]α +
∑
2m+n≤k
| ∂m+n∂xn∂tmu|0 for u ∈ Ck+α([0, T ]× R),
turns Ck+α([0, T ]×R) into a Banach space. In particular, we shall have occasion to use the spaces
C1+α([0, T ]× R) and C2+α([0, T ]× R) with norms
|u|1+α = [ux]α + |u|0 + |ux|0, and
|u|2+α = [ut]α + [uxx]α + |ut|0 + |uxx|0 + |ux|0 + |u|0.
Analogous constructions can be performed in the isotropic setting, i.e., in our case, for functions
u of a single variable. For α ∈ (0, 1], in an act of notation overload, we set
[u]α = sup
x1 6=x2∈R
u(x1)− u(x2)
|x1 − x2|α , |u|α = [u]α + supx∈R |u(x)| .
Then, the Hölder space Ck+α(R), k ∈ N0, is a linear space consisting of all functions u : R → R
which admit k continuous derivatives and whose kth derivative d
k
dxk
u satisfies [ d
k
dxk
u]α < ∞. It
becomes a Banach space when endowed with the norm |·|k+α defined in analogy with its anisotropic
counterpart. Further information on Hölder spaces can be found in a variety of classical treatments
of parabolic PDEs; for example, the reader might want to consult [21] for an unbounded-domain
setting similar to ours, or [22] and [30] for a more thorough analysis of linear and quasilinear
parabolic PDEs on bounded domains.
In addition to the classical function spaces, we shall have occasion to use functions which depend
on an additional variable n ∈ {0, 1}. For α ∈ (0, 1], and k ∈ N0, the space of all such functions for
which k + α – Hölder continuity is required on both n = 0– and n = 1– slices, will be denoted by
Ck+α([0, T ]× R × {0, 1}) (or Ck+α(R × {0, 1}) in the isotropic case). The natural (and Banach)
norm used in those spaces is the maximum of the Hölder norms of the n-slices:
|u|k+α = max(|u(·, 0)|k+α, |u(·, 1)|k+α),
[u]k+α = max([u(·, 0)]k+α, [u(·, 1)]k+α).
Gordan Žitković Stochastic Equilibria 22
Similarly, for u ∈ C([0, T ]× R× {0, 1}), we define
⌈u⌉ = max(⌈u(·, ·, 0)⌉, ⌈u(·, ·, 1)⌉), and ⌊u⌋ = min(⌊u(·, ·, 0)⌋, ⌊u(·, ·, 1)⌋).
A.2. Some useful results on Hölder spaces. When dealing with various constants in the
statements and proofs of results below, we use the following convention:
Convention 2.
(1) The variables µ, γ and α ∈ (0, 1) are considered “global” and will not change throughout the
paper. Any function of the global variables (and global variables only) if called a universal
constant.
(2) The notation a  b means that there exists a universal constant C > 0 such that a ≤ Cb.
Such a constant may change from line to line.
We start with several well-known interpolation results which we rephrase (and minimally adjust).
Theorem A.1 (Parabolic interpolation - additive form - [21], Theorem 8.8.1., p. 124.).
There exists a universal constant C > 0, such that for any ε > 0, and u ∈ C2+α([0, T ] × R) we
have
[u]α ≤ ε[u]2+α + Cε−α/2|u|0,
[ux]α ≤ ε[u]2+α + Cε−(1+α)|u|0,
|ux|0 ≤ ε[u]2+α + Cε−1/(1+α)|u|0.
Corollary A.2. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that any function u ∈ C2+α([0, T ]×
R) which satisfies the inequality
[u]2+α ≤ D + E|u|0 + F [u]α +G|ux|0 +H [ux]α,
for some constants D,E, F,G ≥ 0, also satisfies the inequality
[u]2+α ≤ C
(
D +
[
E + F 1+α/2 +G
1+
1
1+α +H2+α
]
|u|0
)
. (A.4)
Proof. By Theorem A.1, with the choice of ε = 16F , we have [u]α ≤ 16F [u]2+α + C(6F )α/2|u|0, so
that
F [u]α ≤ 16 [u]2+α + CF 1+α/2|u|0.
Similarly,
G|ux|0 ≤ 16 [u]2+α + CG
1+
1
1+α |u|0 and H [ux]α ≤ 16 [u]2+α + CH2+α|u|0.
The estimate (A.4) now follows from
[u]2+α ≤ D + E|u|0 + F [u]α +G|ux|α +H [ux]α
≤ D + 12 [u]2+α + C
[
E + F 1+α/2 +G
1+
1
1+α +H2+α
]
|u|0.

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Theorem A.3 (Parabolic interpolation - multiplicative form - [21], Exercise 8.8.2., p. 125.).
There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that for any u ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R) we have
[u]2+αα ≤ C[u]α2+α|u|20,
|ux|2+α0 ≤ C[u]2+α|u|1+α0 ,
[ux]
2+α
α ≤ C[u]1+α2+α|u|0.
(A.5)
Theorem A.4 (A Hölder estimate - based on [21], Exercise 9.1.4, p. 139.). There exists a
universal constant C > 0 such that for any u ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R)
[u]2+α ≤ C([ut + 12uxx]α + [u(T, ·)]2+α). (A.6)
Corollary A.5 (AHölder estimate with a transport term). There exists a universal constant
C > 0 such that for any u ∈ C2+α([0, T ]× R) and h ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R) we have
[u]2+α ≤ C
(
[ut +
1
2uxx + hux]α + [u(T, ·)]2+α +
(
1 + |h|2+αα
)|u|0). (A.7)
Proof. The Hölder estimate of Theorem A.4 implies that for f = ut + 12uxx + hux and g = u(T, ·)
we have
[u]2+α  [g]2+α + [f − hux]α  [g]2+α + [f ]α + |h|0[ux]α + [h]α|ux|0,
and (A.7) follows from Corollary A.2. 
We finish this section with a preparatory result which states that composition with a C2-function
x 7→ eγx is a locally Lipschitz mapping on Cα([0, T ]×R). Even though it is quite likely that such
a result is well-known, we were unable to locate a reference, and so, for the sake of completeness,
a proof is provided.
Lemma A.6. For γ ≥ 0, let Eγ : Cα([0, T ]× R)→ C([0, T ]× R) be the composition mapping
Eγu(t, x) = e
γu(t,x) for u ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R).
Then Eγu ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R) and the following bounds hold for all u, u(1), u(2) ∈ Cα([0, T ]× R),
|Eγu|0 ≤ eγ⌈u⌉, (A.8)
[Eγu]α ≤ γeγ⌈u⌉[u]α, (A.9)
|Eγu(2) − Eγu(1)|0 ≤ γD|u(2) − u(1)|0, and (A.10)
[Eγu
(2) − Eγu(1)]α ≤ γD
(
[u(2) − u(1)]α + γ[u(2)]α|u(2) − u(1)|0
)
, (A.11)
where D = eγ⌈u
(1)⌉∨⌈u(2)⌉.
Proof. Since 0 ≤ Eγu ≤ supt,x eγu(t,x), (A.8) holds. For (A.9), we note that, by the intermediate
value theorem, ∣∣∣eγu(s,y) − eγu(t,x)∣∣∣ = γeγξ |u(s, y)− u(t, x)| , (A.12)
for some convex combination ξ of u(t, x) and u(s, y), so that eγξ ≤ eγ⌈u⌉.
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In order to get the other two bounds, we pick u(1), u(2) ∈ Cα([0, T ] × R), (t1, x1), (t2, x2) ∈
[0, T ] × R and set d = dp
(
(t1, x1), (t2, x2)
)
and δu(k) = u(k)(t2, x2) − u(k)(t1, x1) for k = 1, 2.
Observe that we can prove (A.10) in a similar manner as (A.9). Focusing on (A.11), we set
δ = eγu
(2)(t2,x2) − eγu(1)(t2,x2) − (eγu(2)(t1,x1) − eγu(1)(t1,x1))
and note the elementary equality
G(b)−G(a) = (b − a)
∫ 1
0
G′(hθ(a, b)) dθ,
where hθ(a, b) = (1− θ)a+ θb, G ∈ C1(R). Then,
|δ| =
∣∣∣δu(2) ∫ 1
0
γeγh
θ(u(2)(t1,x1),u
(2)(t2,x2)) dθ − δu(1)
∫ 1
0
γeγh
θ(u(1)(t1,x1),u
(1)(t2,x2)) dθ
∣∣∣
≤ γD
∣∣∣δu(2) − δu(1)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣δu(2) ∫ 1
0
δh(θ)
∫ 1
0
γ2eγg(η,θ) dη dθ
∣∣∣,
where
δh(θ) = hθ(u(2)(t1, x1)− u(1)(t1, x1), u(2)(t2, x2)− u(1)(t2, x2)),
g(η, θ) = hη(hθ(u(1)(t1, x1), u
(1)(t2, x2)), h
θ(u(2)(t1, x1), u
(2)(t2, x2))).
Clearly, g(η, θ) is a convex combination of values of functions u(1) and u(2) and the inequality
δh(θ) ≤ |u(2) − u(1)|0 holds. Therefore,
|δ| ≤ D
(
[u(2) − u(1)]αγdα + [u(2)]α|u(2) − u(1)|0γ2dα
)
, (A.13)
which directly implies (A.11). 
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